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PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY: MAKING IT THE NORM,
RATHER THAN THE EXCEPTION
GORDON W. NETZORG' & TOBIN D. KERN'
INTRODUCTION
Our discovery system is broken. It is broken because the standard of
"broad and liberal discovery," the hallowed principle that has governed
discovery in the U.S. for over seventy years,' has become an invitation to
abuse. Only the most well-heeled litigants can afford to bring or defend a
case that is likely to generate significant discovery, as most cases in this
electronic age do. Until the default is reversed from "all you can eat"
discovery to proportional discovery geared to the needs of the case, as
the rules already contemplate,2 the courthouse doors will remain closed
to legitimate cases that the average citizen3 cannot afford to bring or de-
fend.
This Article argues proportional discovery should replace the
"broad and liberal" discovery currently permitted under the Federal
Rules. Rather than examine the theoretical underpinnings of the discov-
ery rules, this Article assesses the current default rule from a practition-
er's perspective. Part I begins by examining the history of federal dis-
covery rules, including recent developments. Part II surveys the typical
reading given to Rule 26(b)(1) and the burdens it imposes in practice.
Part III attempts to assess the systemic impact of modern discovery by
reference to federal court statistics published by the Administrative Of-
fice of the U.S. Courts, and examines an illustrative case that demon-
strates the costs and delays that may deter the assertion of meritorious
claims and defenses. Part IV argues for a return to the concept of propor-
tional discovery as a default rule in place of broad and permissive dis-
covery. The concept of proportional discovery and proposed model rules
t Gordon W. Netzorg is a past president of the Colorado Trial Lawyers Association. He is a
member of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery, and is a partner in the
Trial Practice Group at Sherman & Howard, LLC.
t Tobin D. Kern is a partner in the Trial Practice Group at Sherman & Howard, LLC, with a
practice focusing on complex litigation including securities, banking, intellectual property, class
actions, and business torts.
1. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,506 (1947).
2. Rule 26(b)(2)(C) directs federal courts to "limit the frequency or extent of discovery" if
the court first determines that "the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
3. See Justice Powell, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521,
522 (1980) (dissenting statement, joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, opposing the 1980
amendments).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
are then described in depth by reference to principles already well-
developed by practice groups and the bench.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DISCOVERY RULES
A. The Emergence of the "Broad and Liberal" Standard
The "broad and liberal discovery" standard first appeared in the
United States in 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
promulgated.4 With thirty-five states having adopted the federal rules as
their own in the years since,5 the rule of "broad and liberal" discovery
established by current Rule 26(b)(1) now dominates in both federal and
state courts. Under Rule 26(b)(1), parties are presumptively entitled to
unearth any fact "relevant" to the case-and to do so at the expense of
the other party-unless the opposing party blocks the discovery. It is an
invitation few litigants decline or avoid, if they dare to enter the court-
house.
Broad discovery functioned without widespread dissatisfaction for
decades after Rule 26 was enacted. In fact, as late as 1970 the Advisory
Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure described the rule in glowing
terms.6 Rule 26(b)(1), the Committee noted, in combination with the shift
to notice pleadings, had marked a "striking and imaginative departure"
from judicially supervised discovery and the cumbersome rules of chan-
cery pleading.7 A 1968 field survey conducted by the Advisory Commit-
tee lent support to this position, and revealed no major complaints re-
garding the broad scope or cost of discovery or its potential for abuse,
leading the committee to conclude:
[T]here is no empirical evidence to warrant a fundamental change in
the philosophy of the discovery rules. No widespread or profound
failings are disclosed in the scope or availability of discovery. The
costs of discovery do not appear to be oppressive, as a general matter,
either in relation to ability to pay or to the stakes of the litigation.
Discovery frequently provides evidence that would not otherwise be
available to the parties and thereby makes for a fairer trial or settle-
ment.
8
4. See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., FINAL REPORT 9 (2009),
http://www.du.edu/legalinstitutepubs/ACTL-IAALS%20Final%2OReport%20Revised%204-15-
09.pdf [hereinafter ACTLIJAALS, FINAL REPORT].
5. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modem Civil Process, 1994
Wis. L. REv. 631, 632 n. 1(1994) (noting that over 35 states have adopted the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for their trial courts).
6. See FED. R. Cv. P. 26 advisory committee's notes to 1970 amendment.
7. See id. tit. V advisory committee's explanatory statement concerning 1970 amendments to
discovery rules.
8. Id. The Advisory Committee survey was done in conjunction with Columbia Law School.
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B. The Current View of Discovery
Forty years later, much has changed. With the emergence of the in-
formation society, sentiments among the bench and bar towards discov-
ery have shifted dramatically. Judges and litigants now routinely describe
modem discovery as a "morass," "nightmare," 9 "quagmire," "monstrosi-
ty," and "fiasco."' If this is how judges and practitioners describe mod-
em discovery, imagine the disdain of the parties themselves whose inter-
ests the system is supposed to protect and serve through a "just, speedy,
and inexpensive" resolution of disputes." In 2008, the American College
of Trial Lawyers ("ACTL") Task Force on Discovery joined with the
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System ("IAALS")
to survey members of the ACTL on the role of discovery and any per-
ceived problems in the United States civil justice system.' 2 Nearly 1,500
ACTL members responded, speaking with an average thirty-eight years
of experience in civil litigation and with nearly equal representation of
plaintiffs and defendants.1 3 An overwhelming majority of the survey
participants reported that discovery has become an end in itself-a costly
weapon used to "bludgeon" parties into settlements. 14 The participants
commented that attomeys, rather than clients, "drive excessive discov-
ery."' 5 Forty-five percent of them believed that discovery is abused in
"almost every case,' 16 and fifty-three percent believed that changes to the
discovery rules since 1976 have not curbed the abuse.
17
The Task Force Survey further revealed a widespread belief that
radical changes to the system are necessary, rather than continued tinker-
ing with the existing rules. Participants complained that "[w]e have sacri-
ficed the prospect of attainable justice for the many in the interest of
finding that one needle in the ... haystacks," and that "[tihe total lack of
control of discovery.., is killing civil litigation."' 18 The fact that many of
the country's leading trial lawyers provided this feedback after signifi-
cant rule changes to address the problem were made in 1983, 1993 and
2000, indicates that in practice, the changes have failed to reduce discov-
ery abuse.
9. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT & 2008 LITIGATION SURVEY OF THE
FELLOWS OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS B-i to B-2 (2008),
http://www.du.edullegalinstitute/pubsllnterim%2Report%2OFinal%20for%20webl.pdf [hereinafter
ACTUIAALS, INTERIM REPORT].
10. PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657 (DNH/RFr),
2007 WL 2687670, at *1, 8, 12 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007).
11. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
12. See ACTULAALS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 1.
13. Id. at 2.
14. See ACT[IIAALS, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 9, at B-1.
15. See id. at A-4.
16. Id. at4.
17. See id. at 5 (emphasis added).
18. See id. at B-1.
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So is the current discovery system merely imperfect, or is it really
broken? Following its Interim Report and the Task Force Survey, the
ACTL and IAALS task force members issued a final report concluding
that "[o]ur discovery system is broken."' 19 If the system is broken, the
report concludes, then it is time to reverse the default discovery rule to
one of proportionality. 2° In other words, it is time to stop tweaking the
rules and change the default from "everything is discoverable" to "you
only get what you need." Discovery has become the tail wagging the dog
in many-if not most-civil cases, resulting in "unacceptable delays and
prohibitive expense.",2' The effects of such delays on the broader goals of
the civil justice system are severe: fewer jury and bench trials, abandon-
ment of meritorious claims by plaintiffs, and relinquishment of valid
defenses by defendants. Many litigants with valid claims or defenses
simply cannot rationalize the time and expense that must be devoted to
bringing or defending a civil case, with the waves of discovery that nor-
mally follow.
22
Judicial attitudes toward the discovery process and the resolution of
discovery disputes show similar frustration and despair, particularly as
electronic information proliferates. Judges now must moderate and de-
termine a whole host of e-discovery disputes, including where such in-
formation resides, in what format, in whose possession, on what fixed or
mobile device, in live, "deleted," or archived status, on whose server, and
on what type of system. And that is just the start. Judges then must sort
through issues such as the existence and relevance of "metadata," altera-
tion and manipulation of electronic information, and the benefits and
burdens of allowing or forbidding forensic examinations. Then comes
assessment of the penalties that should be imposed upon a party who
permitted a "relevant" byte of data to slip away unpreserved.
These issues are not going away. In the modem era, "virtually all
discovery involves electronic discovery to some extent., 23 One can sym-
pathize with Judge Randolph Treece of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of New York, who bemoans a "landscape [that] may be
littered with more casualties than successes" in the modem era of elec-
tronic discovery. 24 The "scope, mechanism, cost, and perplexity" of
modem discovery is now, more often than not, simply laid at the feet of
the courts when well-heeled litigants-armed with expensive e-
19. See ACTLIIAALS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 9.
20. See id. at 10.
21. Id. at 1.
22. See id. at 2.
23. Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, No. 1316-VCP, 2009 WL 2997984, at *7 (Del. Ch. May
29, 2009).
24. PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657 (DNH/RFr),
2007 WL 2687670, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007).
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consultants--cannot resolve the issues themselves after months or even
years of wrangling.25
Like the ACTL and LAALS, many courts are now recognizing the
broader implications of the presumption of "broad and liberal" discovery
under Rule 26(b)(1) in the modem age. The costs and delays associated
with permitting discovery of "any non-privileged matter," so long as it is
relevant, can overwhelm the very purpose of discovery and the overarch-
ing goals of civil dispute resolution. As one court summarized, "The
more information there is to discover, the more expensive it is to discov-
er all the relevant information until, in the end, 'discovery is not just
about uncovering the truth, but also about how much of the truth the par-
ties can afford to disinter."26
C. Proportional Discovery: A New Trend?
Federal and state rules of discovery have, of course, long included
means by which courts and litigants can attempt to reign in the cost, de-
lay and burdens of discovery. Such mechanisms include, principally, the
limitations and proportionality guidelines of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and the
protective order provisions of Rule 26(c). In practice, however, those
protections lie dormant, or are made subservient, to the default rule in
favor of virtually unlimited discovery. Unless and until the responding
party can muster a specific objection to a particular discovery request,
with sufficient evidence to back it up, any and all relevant information
must be produced. The real burden, in practice, remains upon the party
resisting discovery. The bar is set so high on the resisting party that the
default rule in favor of virtually unlimited discovery of any relevant fact
routinely prevails.
Many participants in the civil justice system with divergent interests
and roles believe the time has come to recognize that the default rule of
"broad and liberal" discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) is not simply "compet-
ing" or in tension with the primary goal of ensuring the "just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination" of civil disputes.27 Instead, it presents an
irreconcilable conflict. Put bluntly and radically, as the ACTL and
IAALS suggest, not every conceivably relevant fact should be discovera-
ble. 8 If we are to preserve our civil justice system, it must be available to
parties to resolve legitimate disputes, whether the damages are in the
thousands or millions of dollars. 29 And if we are going to restore mea-
25. See id.
26. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Rowe
Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421,423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
27. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1; cf Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 311 ("This case provides a textbook
example of the difficulty of balancing the competing needs of broad discovery and manageable
costs.").
28. See ACTIIAALS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 9, 11.
29. This applies equally to smaller defense cases, where defendants regularly settle claims
with valid defenses, rather than incur the disproportionate costs of discovery. See id. at 2.
2010]
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ningful access, we cannot continue to price litigants out of the system
with "over-discovery."
30
The default rule, therefore, should be reversed: relevant facts should
be discoverable only in proportion to the specific claims and defenses in
dispute, as determined by the judge at an early case management confe-
rence using factors such as those set forth in Rule 26(b)(2)(C), and no
further discovery of facts should be allowed without a showing of good
cause.31 Under this reverse default rule, the ability to show relevancy is
not the dominating test; as experience has shown, "relevancy" is not
much of a test at all. Instead, the dominating factor under the new rule is
whether requested discovery passes a threshold, common sense,
cost/benefit analysis under established proportionality factors.3z
II. "BROAD AND LIBERAL DISCOVERY" IN PRACTICE
The pre-2000 version of Rule 26(b)(1) defined the scope of discov-
ery in now-familiar terms:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discov-
ery or to the claim or defense of any other party ....
The U.S. Supreme Court made clear from the onset of modem dis-
covery that the scope of discovery authorized by Rule 26 was to be con-
strued broadly and liberally. In its oft-quoted 1947 opinion in Hickman v.
Taylor, the Court declared that the common cry of a "fishing expedition"
no longer would be sufficient to block discovery; instead, litigants must
"disgorge whatever facts" they may have that are "relevant" to the sub-
ject matter.'
By 1978, the rule announced in Hickman v. Taylor was in full ef-
fect. The high court construed the scope of discovery authorized by Rule
26 so broadly that discovery could only be denied if its relevance was
limited to stricken claims or defenses, if it related to events occurring
well outside the relevant time period, or if it was sought for use in a dif-
ferent proceeding.35 Such self-evident boundaries offered almost no pro-
tection from massive and intrusive discovery, because "relevancy," as
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment.
31. See ACTLIAALS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 9.
32. See id. at 14 ("Electronic discovery should be limited by proportionality, taking into
account the nature and scope of the case, relevance, importance to the court's adjudication, expense
and burdens.").
33. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) (1993 amendment), reprinted in 6 JAMES WM. MOORE Er AL.,
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26 app. 10 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2009).
34. 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1946) (internal quotation marks omitted). We note that the decision
was rendered before the Xerox Model A, the first commercial copier, was introduced in 1949, and
long before the advent of electronically stored information.
35. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 352 (1978).
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defined by the rule, was virtually limitless. Discovery relating to the sub-
ject matter of the case would be deemed "relevant" whether or not it re-
lated to the merits of the case, the claims and defenses presented, or the
issues raised by the pleadings. The rationale, the court reaffirmed, was
that discovery serves to "help define and clarify the issues., 36
Lower federal courts picked up the Hickman v. Taylor theme in the
years afterward, and have described the scope of discovery under Rule
26(b)(1) in even broader terms. Discovery is presumptively permitted if
there is "any possibility" that the information sought relates to the "gen-
eral subject matter" of the case;37 conversely, information is off-limits
from discovery only if it can be said with assurance that the information
sought has "no possible bearing" on the issues actually pled or the issues
that may arise during the course of the case.38
With multi-count complaints and stock lists of affirmative defenses
having become commonplace in current litigation, along with the fre-
quency of amended pleadings to add claims and defenses, one is left to
wonder whether broad and liberal discovery helps "define and narrow"
the issues to be tried, or merely serves to expand them. Causes of action
and affirmative defenses can be "piled on" at the pleading stage, in the
hope that broad and liberal discovery will eventually provide some sup-
port, so long as the relatively modest hurdle of Rule 11 is cleared.
39 Jus-
tice Powell may have had it right all along, when he observed in 1980
that Rule 26 "invite[s] discovery of such scope and duration that district
judges often cannot keep the practice within reasonable bounds."0
On its face, of course, Rule 26 prohibits discovery that is unduly
burdensome, costly, duplicative or unnecessary, by way of Rule 26(b)(2)
and Rule 26(c). Such safeguards in theory counterbalance the broad read-
ing given to "relevancy" under Rule 26(b)(1). In practice, however, the
sweeping scope of Rule 26(b)(1) has translated into a strong presumption
that "relevant" discovery is allowed unless and until the responding party
obtains a court order to prevent a specific request made. "[T]he resisting
party must show how, given the broad and liberal reading afforded the
Federal Rules of discovery, each interrogatory and document request is
36. Id. at 351 (citing Hickman, 329 U.S. at 500-01).
37. Marker v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 121, 124 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
38. Hammond v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 216 F.R.D. 666, 670 (D. Kan. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 690 (D. Kan. 2001)); see
also Foster v. Berwind Corp., No. 90-0857, 1990 WL 209288, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 1990).
39. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (requiring certification that a reasonable inquiry was made before
filing).
40. Powell, supra note 3, at 522. Justice Powell further commented that the effect of "un-
trammeled" discovery upon "the average citizen's ability to afford legal remedies" could not serious-
ly be questioned. Id.
2010]
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irrelevant, overly broad, burdensome, oppressive, or requested in bad
faith.
41
Many courts still pay lip service to the burden of "establishing rele-
vancy" that the party requesting discovery bears,42 but in reality the bar
of relevancy is set so low as to present virtually no burden at all. The
requesting party need only show that the discovery sought is "germane"
to the case.43 Unless a party's request for relevant information is overly
broad or otherwise objectionable "on its face," the burden immediately
shifts to the party resisting discovery.44 It does not take an experienced or
clever practitioner to craft discovery requests that are at least germane to
the case on the face of the request. One can remain intentionally vague
and speak in the broadest of terms with discovery demands, unless and
until a specific objection is made and then sustained.
The resisting party, on the other hand, bears a heavy burden. The re-
sisting litigant must "specifically demonstrat[e]" that discovery will
cause a "clearly defined and serious injury. 4 5 To meet that high stan-
dard, the resisting party must make a "particularized factual showing" of
the harm that will result.46 "[B]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated
by specific examples, are insufficient, ' 7 and "a mere showing that the
discovery may involve inconvenience or expense does not establish good
cause" sufficient to block the discovery sought.48 Evidence must be mar-
shaled by the resisting litigant as to each and every discovery request to
which an objection is made, and failure to do so can mean discovery is
granted in bulk, as a matter of course, with no further inquiry.49 Not only
is the resisting party's obligation to produce information presumed, so
too is his duty to pay for the costs of production. 50 The resisting party can
even be required to spend her own time and resources compiling and
researching relevant data, and interviewing witnesses at the direction of
her opponent.5'
The potential for abuse, cost, and delay created by this system of
"broad and liberal discovery" has gradually received the attention of the
Advisory Committee. In 1983, Rule 26(b)(1) was amended to add specif-
41. Phillips v. Dale, No. 86-2690, 1987 WL 9650, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1987).
42. PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657 (DNHIRFI),
2007 WL 2687670, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 7, 2007).
43. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Hammond v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 216 F.R.D. 666,672 (D. Kan. 2003).
45. Lakeland Partners, L.L.C. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 124, 133 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Forest Prods. Nw., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. CI. 109, 114 (2004)).
46. Id. (quoting Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 433 (1991)).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 137.
49. Phillips v. Dale, No. 86-2690, 1987 WL 9650, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1987).
50. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
51. Medcorp, Inc. v. Pinpoint Techs., Inc., No. 08-cv-00867-MSK-KLM, 2009 WL 1049758,
at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2009).
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ic grounds upon which the courts could limit the "frequency or extent" of
discovery, including a recognition that in some cases discovery is simply
disproportionate to the amount in controversy, the needs of the case, the
importance of the issues presented and the resources of the parties. 2 The
proportionality factors recited were intended to guard against "over-
discovery" and to encourage judges to be more aggressive in preventing
abuse.53
By 1993, the Advisory Committee explicitly recognized that "broad
and liberal" discovery might lead to vastly greater cost, delay, and wide-
spread abuse, particularly with the proliferation of electronic informa-
tion: "The information explosion of recent decades has greatly increased
both the potential cost of wide-ranging discovery and the potential for
discovery to be used as an instrument for delay or oppression."54 Never-
theless, while attempting to put "tighter rein" on discovery, the Advisory
Committee left unchanged Rule 26(b)(1)'s presumptive rule in favor of
broad and liberal discovery.55
In 2000, the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) was finally nar-
rowed substantively, by permitting only discovery that is relevant to the
"claims and defenses," and not merely the "subject matter" of the case. A
requirement of good cause was imposed for discovery beyond the new,
"refined" boundary. With the 2000 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1), the
Advisory Committee acknowledged that concerns among the bench and
bar over cost, delay, and "over-discovery" in general had become persis-
tent. At the same time, the committee acknowledged that the new boun-
dary would be difficult to enforce. The "dividing line" between informa-
tion relevant to the general subject matter of the case, but not the actual
claims and defenses, is difficult to draw.56
Indeed, one might argue that there is no such dividing line at all. If
information is relevant to the subject matter of the case, which in turn is
determined by reference to the claims and defenses alleged, then by defi-
nition such information probably qualifies as at least "reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence., 57 In the end, the
Advisory Committee summarized that the scope of discovery under the
amendment "depends on the circumstances"-hardly a dividing line at
alL.
58
52. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment.
53. Id.
54. Id. advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment.
55. See id.
56. Id. advisory committee's notes to 2000 amendment.
57. Id. 26(b)(1).
58. Id. advisory committee's notes to 2000 amendment.
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Judicial opinions appear to confirm that little has changed since the
1983, 1993 and 2000 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1).59 The default rule of
broad and liberal discovery remains intact. In 2010, even after all these
rule amendments, the presumption continues to be that if there exists
"any possibility"6° that information or material is relevant to the case, "it
should generally be produced., 61 The resisting party continues to bear the
burden of showing by specific proof why information should not be pro-
duced, whether on the basis of cost, burden or need.62 In short, the
"strong preference for broad production" continues to dominate. So too
does the presumption that the responding party must pay the way of his
inquisitive opponent, whether or not the information sought is in paper or
electronic repositories, live or archived, measured in bankers boxes or in
gigabytes.
63
Conversely, limitations on discovery are rarely enforced absent a
specific, fact-supported challenge mounted by the resisting party. Courts
with crowded dockets seem to prefer--or are simply more accustomed
to-resolution of discovery disputes by an itemized analysis of each dis-
puted discovery request and the sufficiency of the specific objection. Still
largely missing is any assessment of whether the discovery sought is
proportional in its broader context, considering the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the significance of the issues, and the resources
of the parties. The judicial "vigor" hoped for by the Advisory Committee
when the proportionality guidelines were first adopted has failed to mate-
rialize.64
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CURRENT DEFAULT RULE
A. "Broad and Liberal": By the Numbers
If the "strong preference for broad discovery" of all relevant facts
remains largely intact, does it matter? At least some cost, delay, and po-
tential for abuse is inherent in any discovery system, of course. One
might argue such distasteful byproducts are "necessary evils" of a system
that strives for fair outcomes by allowing the parties and the courts to
consider all relevant facts. The ACTL and IAALS argue, however, that
the problems with the current discovery system are systemic, and the
consequences are severe. According to the members of the ACTL who
59. See, e.g., Medcorp, Inc. v. Pinpoint Techs., Inc., No. 08-cv-00867-MSK-KLM, 2009 WL
1049758, at *2-4 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2009).
60. Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Group,
Inc., 232 F.R.D. 377, 382 (D. Kan. 2005)).
61. Id.
62. Payless Shoesource Worldwide, Inc. v. Target Corp., No. 05-4023-JAR, 2007 WL
1959194, at *13 (D. Kan. June 29, 2007).
63. Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, L.L.C., 655 F. Supp. 2d 146, 148 (D. Mass. 2009); Med-
corp, 2009 WL 1049758, at *2-3.
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment.
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responded to the Task Force Survey, 65 parties with the means or fortitude
to use the court system now face longer waits than ever to get to trial,
and at exponentially greater costs. The result is far fewer jury and bench
trials.66 Many parties are forced to settle to avoid the sheer cost and de-
lay. The system can hardly be called "fair," "just" or "speedy," when the
cost and delay of discovery is used to "bludgeon a case to settlement.,
67
Federal court statistics lend support to the ACTL and IAALS con-
clusions regarding fewer trials and longer delays, even if factors other
than discovery play a role. According to the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, the delay in getting a federal civil case to trial in the last
seventeen years has steadily gone from 15 months to 25 months,68 and
the upward climb shows no signs of abating. Clients now must wait over
two years to get to trial, while the parties slog through expensive discov-
ery and related motions practice. At the same time, the average number
of civil cases handled annually by each federal judge has remained con-
stant, even as the economy and population grow. Thus, while the number
of cases remains constant, the number of trials conducted has steadily
decreased over the last seventeen years and has flat-lined, both in raw
numbers and as a percentage of civil cases filed. The following table
summarizes the statistics69:
Year Median Months - Civil Trials Per Civil Cases
Case Filing to Trial Judge Per Judge
1992 15 32 355
1993 16 30 354
1994 18 27 364
1995 18 27 383
1996 18 27 416
1997 19 26 420
1998 19.5 25 398
65. Nearly forty-two percent of the ACTL's membership responded. See ACTUIlAALS,
FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
66. Id. at 3.
67. ACTIJAALS, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 9, at B-1.
68. See STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURT-
JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE (2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2008.pl (click "gener-
ate" button) [hereinafter 2008 CASELOAD PROFILE]; STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, DISTRICT COURT-JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE (1997), http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/cms.pl (click "generate" button) [hereinafter 1997 CASELOAD PROFILE].
69. Data compiled from Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Court Management
Statistics, Judicial Caseload Profile, twelve-month annual statistics for period ending Sep. 30 of each
year. See 2008 CASELOAD PROFILE, supra note 68; STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, DISTRICT COURT-JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE (2003), http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/cmsd2003.pl (click "generate" button); 1997 CASELOAD PROFILE, supra note 68.
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1999 20.5 23 403
2000 20.0 22 396
2001 21.6 20 377
2002 21.8 19 413
2003 22.5 19 372
2004 22.6 19 414
2005 22.5 19 374
2006 23.2 19 383
2007 24.6 20 380
2008 24.8 20 394
These numbers are troubling. Not only do they show that it is taking
longer to get to trial, but the "Trials Per Judge" statistic may overstate the
number of civil trials because it apparently also includes criminal trials.
Furthermore, the ACTL and IAALS conclude that "[s]ome deserving
cases are not brought because the cost of pursuing them fails a rational
cost-benefit test while some other cases of questionable merit and small-
er cases are settled rather than tried because it costs too much to litigate
them., 70 This suggests that many parties with valid claims or defenses
simply opt out of the system altogether to avoid the costs, delays, and
disruption associated with the discovery system. If this is true, then the
current model of discovery might have an even stronger suppressive ef-
fect than is reflected in caseload statistics.
Proof that meritorious claims and defenses are simply abandoned by
potential litigants, in response to the costs imposed by the current dis-
covery system, is difficult to find beyond the type of survey conducted
by ACTL and IAALS. But one can look to reported opinions to see that
litigants who may have meritorious claims or defenses often face puni-
tive discovery burdens. If an aggrieved party dares to bring or defend a
case likely to trigger substantial discovery requests from the other side,
as most civil cases do today, she must be prepared for the overwhelming
costs and delay that will result. In other words, rational litigants have to
predict whether the discovery nightmare they can expect is worth it. The
following section illustrates one such case.
70. ACTI.IAALS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.
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B. Case Study: Orrell v. Motorcarparts of America, Inc.71
Tanya Orrell brought a Title VII claim against her former employer,
alleging sexual harassment and a hostile work environment. 72 Orrell al-
leged that over a three-year period, beginning in 2002, she was harassed
by "several" co-workers and customers.73 Some of the harassment alle-
gedly took the form of "hundreds" of pornographic and offensive emails
directed to Orrell.74 Orrell, who traveled frequently for the defendant,
received many of the alleged emails on her company-issued laptop com-
puter.75 Orrell also testified that it was her practice to forward emails
from her laptop to her home computer.76 In addition, Orrell had sent
some of the offensive emails to her husband over the 3-year period, deli-
vered to his work computer.77
Upon termination of her employment, Orrell and her husband had
the laptop hard drive "wiped" of all data before returning it to her em-
ployer, allegedly to protect personal financial information. That, of
course, was an enormous mistake. The discovery sought by the employer
upon filing of the complaint was predictably exhaustive and penal. The
employer demanded Orrell and her husband identify all computers used
over the 3-year period of the suit, plus an additional four years going
back to the date of her original employment with the defendant in 1998.79
The defendant then made demand for production of "[a]ny and all docu-
ments concerning [the employer] retained by you or obtained by you in
any manner during or from your [seven years of] employment., 80
Orrell produced twenty-two pages of emails from 2003-2004 sup-
porting her claim, but the defendant deemed that production insuffi-
cient.8' Orrell and her husband then paid a technical consultant to pro-
duce back-up tapes of additional responsive documents including 10,000
printed pages. 82 The defendant also demanded a forensic examination of
the husband's business computer and a third computer the couple used
for a side business.83 The defendant further demanded that Orrell answer
interrogatories detailing each and every instance of alleged harassment
over the three-year period, by whom, the specific content, together with
the time, date, and location of each event and the identity of any observ-
71. No. 3:06CV418-R, 2007 WL 4287750 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 5, 2007).






78. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Id. at *3-4.
80. Id. at *2.
81. ld. at *2-3.
82. See id.
83. Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ers or persons with knowledge of such event.84 Orrell had specifically
identified persons with knowledge of the harassment she alleged, but she
did not give further explanation. 85 The defendant also demanded all
records relating to Orrell's post-termination employment to evaluate her
claim of lost wages and compliance with her duty to mitigate damages.86
Orrell had produced only her tax returns showing her income and sources
for all relevant periods.87
The Orrell court granted the defendant's motion to compel on vir-
tually all issues, without ever discussing the cost or burden imposed upon
Orrell in light of the damages claimed and the importance of the issues
presented.88 For example, according to the published opinion, the court
failed to consider whether production of less than all of the offensive
emails by Orrell was sufficient in light of the claims made, or whether
she would simply have to risk losing the case on the basis of not having
retained all of the "hundreds" of emails alleged. 89 Nor, according to the
opinion, did the court consider whether relevant electronic communica-
tions were accessible by a search of the company's own computer sys-
tems, or the overall significance of the emails in light of other acts of
harassment alleged. Nor did the court evidently consider the feasibility or
nature of the burden that would be imposed upon the company by simply
interviewing the persons identified by Orrell. Instead, as might be ex-
pected, the court simply cited the default rule that all "relevant" informa-
tion is presumptively discoverable, and chastised Orrell for not preserv-
ing all offending emails that accumulated over the three-year period.90
Although the case involved a personal claim brought by a relatively un-
sophisticated plaintiff, the court cited the same rigid duty to produce and
preserve all electronic data that applies to corporate litigants engaged in a
multi-million dollar commercial dispute.91
Whether or not Orrell's claims had merit, any sexual harassment
victim or her counsel reading the discovery opinion would undoubtedly
think long and hard before filing a Title VII claim that relies on volu-
minous emails exchanged over a lengthy period of time-regardless of
the fact that email has become one of the primary means of intra-
company communication in today's business world.
Perhaps creation of a disincentive to sue from the threat of massive
discovery is the whole point, from a defendant's perspective. Intentional
or not, massive discovery sends a message to the next potential plaintiff.
84. Id. at *8.
85. Id. at *5.
86. Id. at *5-6.
87. Id. at *5.
88. See id. at *9-10.
89. See id. at * 1-2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. See id. at *1-6.
91. See id at *6-8.
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And, to be fair, plaintiffs and their counsel are equally incentivized by
the current discovery system to use the threat of costly, invasive, and
time-consuming discovery to cause defendants to settle cases quickly for
substantial payment rather than pursue valid defenses. That is not a fair
system. That is a system where the party able to launch the most aggres-
sive and far-reaching discovery campaign prevails, regardless of how the
law applies on the merits. Once again, it appears Justice Powell accurate-
ly warned of such results nearly three decades ago. 92
IV. MAKING PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY THE RULE, RATHER THAN THE
EXCEPTION
A. Proportionality as a Default Rule
There is another way. The default rule for discovery should start
with proportionality, and a recognition that not all conceivably-relevant
facts are discoverable in every case.9 3 To be sure, proportionality factors
are already a part of the discovery rules. Rule 26(b)(2)(C) provides:
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent
of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it de-
termines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or
can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain
the information by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in con-
troversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake
in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the is-
94sues.
But while proportionality limits are available, in practice the guide-
lines are rarely used. Instead, proportionality takes a back seat to the
strong presumption in favor of broad and liberal discovery. As the ACTL
and IAALS put it, "these factors are rarely if ever applied because of the
92. Powell, supra note 3, at 523 ("[A]U too often, discovery practices enable the party with
greater financial resources to prevail by exhausting the resources of a weaker opponent. The mere
threat of delay or unbearable expense denies justice to many actual or prospective litigants. Persons
or businesses of comparatively limited means settle unjust claims and relinquish just claims simply
because they cannot afford to litigate.").
93. Large, complex cases, cases with important social issues, and other cases which require
extensive discovery would properly get extensive discovery. Less complicated and smaller cases that
do not require such extensive discovery would not.
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
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longstanding notion that parties are entitled to discover all facts, without
limit, unless and until a court says otherwise. 95
Attorneys are required to zealously advocate for their clients. Ex-
cessive or evasive discovery tactics are among the most commonly used
tools to induce a favorable settlement--or to deter a claim altogether,
depending on which side abuses the process. Unless and until attorneys
are forced to make discovery proportionate, the abuses outlined in this
article will continue. Guidelines, to put it bluntly, are not enough. Courts
and litigants will continue to look primarily to the rules in discovery-as
they should. Therefore the rules must be explicitly changed to make li-
mited discovery the primary and presumptive rule of discovery, not the
exception: "The primary goal [should be] to change the default from
unlimited discovery to limited discovery. . . .Additional discovery
beyond the default limits would be allowed only upon a showing of good
cause and proportionality.,
96
Reversing the default rule means proportionality would replace re-
levancy as the most important principle guiding discovery. Relevancy
would remain a threshold requirement, but would not be a license to ob-
tain discovery regardless of the burden or expense imposed on the oppo-
nent if the costs of discovery outweigh the likely benefit.97 While such a
costlbenefit approach to discovery may strike some practitioners as invit-
ing subjectivity, it is a policy choice already built into the existing rules,
albeit secondary to the greater goal of allowing a virtually unbridled
search for truth. Until proportionality becomes the guiding principle,
virtually unlimited discovery will continue unless and until the respond-
ing party convinces the court to actually apply the proportionality fac-
tors-and almost none do.
In 2009, the ACTL and IAALS, following their eighteen-month
joint project and survey on discovery, developed "Pilot Project Rules"
designed to encourage the discovery reforms included in the groups'
final report. Proportionality takes center stage as the governing principle
for the entire pre-trial process:
Rule 1.2. At all times, the court and parties must address the action in
ways designed to assure that the process and the costs are proportio-
nate to the amount in controversy and the complexity and importance
of the issues. The factors to be considered by the court in making a
proportionality assessment include, without limitation: needs of the
case, amount in controversy, parties' resources, and complexity and
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. This proportionality
95. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., 21ST CENTURY CivIL. JUSTICE
SYSTEM: A ROADMAP FOR REFORM: PILOT PROJEcr RULES 2 (2009) [hereinafter IAALS, PPR].
96. ACTIAALS, FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 11.
97. For example, the benefit of obtaining potentially tangential or duplicative facts may not
justify the added burdens and costs.
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rule is fully applicable to all discovery, including the discovery of
electronically stored information.
98
The ACTL and IAALS suggested rule, in addition to reversing the
default rule, realistically recognizes that litigants, acting as zealous advo-
cates for their clients, are likely to end the tug-of-war over relevancy and
instead focus upon proportional discovery only when they are forced to
do so. The suggested rule is perhaps an indirect concession that long-
standing judicial calls for "cooperat[ion]" and "collaboration" 99 among
opposing parties and counsel, and hopes for more "reasonable law-
yers," ° are at best inconsistent with the aggressive, zealous representa-
tion that lawyers strive to give their clients-and at worst naive. Oppos-
ing counsel are not companions in the discovery process. Unless required
by the rules to jointly devise a plan of proportionate discovery, mandated
by the court if necessary, lawyers will simply continue costly and time-
consuming battles over the scope of "relevant" information to be ex-
changed.
Proportionality is quickly becoming the guiding principle for dis-
covery of electronic information, as courts are increasingly forced to
grapple with the issue.101 Thus, the reform we recommend is as follows:
make proportionality the guiding, mandatory principle for all discovery,
including the Rule 26 required disclosures, interrogatories, document
requests, requests for admissions, third party subpoenas, and party and
non-party depositions. If a weighting of the relative costs and benefits is
appropriate for electronic discovery, then there is no principled reason
why proportionality should not be the guiding principle for all forms of
discovery.
For example, The Sedona Conference Working Group has discussed
the costs of producing electronic information in terms that apply to all
discovery. 10 2 Electronic or other discovery must take into account not
only the hard costs of locating and retrieving relevant information, but
also the less quantifiable or even non-monetary costs, "including the
interruption and disruption of routine business processes and the costs of
reviewing the information" and "the resources required to review docu-
ments for relevance, privilege, confidentiality, and privacy."' 0 3 Absent a
balancing test required by a rule of proportionality, warns the Sedona
Conference, electronic discovery costs alone stand to "overwhelm the
98. IAALS, PPR, supra note 95, at 1-2.
99. Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, LLC, 655 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D. Mass. 2009).
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes to 2000 amendment.
101. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC., 217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Rowe
Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421,426 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
102. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD.,
THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: SECOND EDITION BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES
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ability to resolve disputes fairly in litigation."' 4 While the Sedona Con-
ference addresses the issue in a business-to-business context, similar
considerations of costs and disruption should apply when determining
the discovery obligations of individuals like Tanya Orrell, discussed ear-
lier.
B. Proportionality in Practice: Early Developments
Building upon the proportionality factors of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and
the work of the Sedona Conference, some federal courts are slowly be-
ginning to enforce proportionality guidelines against litigants-albeit
primarily in the context of electronic discovery. In Rowe Entertainment,
Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., °5 for example, U.S. Magistrate
Judge James C. Francis IV developed an eight-factor proportionality test
for e-discovery that supplemented Rule 26(b)(2)(C) with considerations
such as "the likelihood of discovering critical information," "the speci-
ficity of the discovery requests," "the total cost associated with produc-
tion," and "the relative ability of each party to control costs and its incen-
tive to do so." 6
In Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC,107 a federal opinion that has
emerged as a primary reference in many e-discovery disputes, Judge
Shira Scheindlin applied and revised the factors developed by the Rowe
court.108 Judge Scheindlin appropriately noted that the "total cost asso-
ciated with production," as referenced in Rowe, is almost always a large
number at least in cases where an objection to production and cost-
shifting is sought. 1°9 Thus, real proportionality, as contemplated by Rule
26(b)(2)(C), requires weighing such production costs against the
"amount in controversy" and the "importance of the issues" for which
the information is sought.1 ° Similarly, Judge Scheindlin observed, real
proportionality requires an assessment of not merely the relative ability
of the parties to produce the discovery requested, but also the "total cost
of [the discovery] as compared to the resources available to each par-
ty."'' "Thus, discovery that would be too expensive for one defendant to
bear would be a drop in the bucket for another."'1 12 The "importance of
104. Id.
105. 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
106. Id. at 429 (emphasis added). The eight-factors are:
(1) the specificity of the discovery requests; (2) the likelihood of discovering critical information; (3)
the availability of such information from other sources; (4) the purposes for which the responding
party maintains the requested data (5) the relative benefit to the parties of obtaining the information;
(6) the total cost associated with production; (7) the relative ability of each party to control costs and
its incentive to do so; and (8) the resources available to each party.
Id.
107. 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
108. Id. at 316-21.






the issues" factor, noted the court, also necessarily raises the question of
the potential public impact of the case." 3 A toxic tort class action or en-
vironmental case, for example, might affect millions of citizens while
other disputes are truly private affairs.'
1 4
C. The 2006 Amendments
Following Zubulake, proportionality concepts were further devel-
oped in the 2006 "e-discovery amendment" to Rule 26, adopted as Rule
26(b)(2)(B).'15 The e-discovery amendment specifically regulates pro-
duction of electronically stored information. 6 Once again, while limited
to the context of electronic information, the rationale for proportional
discovery cited by the Advisory Committee applies with equal force to
all forms of discovery. The Advisory Committee explicitly recognized
that a producing party should be obligated to disgorge only electronic
information "reasonably accessible," as measured by burden and cost,
after which further information would require the requesting party to
show good cause. 17 The Committee specifically calls for a rational
cost/benefit analysis that takes into account the parties' resources, the
issues at stake in the litigation, and other proportionality factors.1 8 This,
we urge, should be the guiding principle for all discovery.
It is too soon to tell whether the foregoing steps towards proportion-
al discovery can be called a trend, but they do offer hope of a more ra-
tional discovery system. Plaintiffs and defendants will likely differ on the
fairness of proportional or limited discovery as applied in particular cas-
es, or even systemically. 1 9 The perceived fairness of proportional dis-
covery may depend upon the adoption of additional reforms that take
into account matters such as fact-based pleading standards applicable to
both plaintiff and defendant, judicial willingness to manage the discovery
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
116. Id.
117. Id. advisory committee's notes to 2006 amendment.
118. Id.
119. A noted plaintiffs attorney, Elizabeth J. Cabraser, in commenting upon the ACTL and
IAALS Final Report, notes that proportional or limited discovery may favor defendants unless done
in conjunction with other civil justice reforms:
Holistically, the Final Report program seems balanced, with a potential to improve the quality, and
reduce the cost, of civil litigation. It is the product of extensive study, thoughtful reflection, discus-
sion and compromise among those with opposing viewpoints, and it reflects the practicality gained
through the litigation experience of seasoned practitioners on both sides of the "v."
The danger is that the project's recommendations will be implemented piecemeal. Discovery limita-
tions on their own spell disaster for the process of fact-finding. In any discovery limitation program,
the defense has the clear advantage: it has the information, and it can hide or destroy the informa-
tion, without plaintiffs being the wiser. Punishment depends on detection, and discovery limitations
make concealment easier and detection less likely. An honor system depends upon the honor of the
participants--and this is the crux of the problem, perceived or real.
Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Uncovering Discovery, 59 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 55,
on file with authors); see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Apportioning Due Process: Preserving the
Right to Affordable Justice, 87 DENY. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010).
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process before disputes arise, early production of documents by the par-
ties, including documents which support defenses, mandatory sanctions
for failure to produce documents, and other factors.
120
CONCLUSION
The time has come to recognize that the "broad and liberal" default
rule of discovery, dominant in the U.S. for over 70 years, has outlived its
useful life. It has increasingly led to unacceptable delay and abuse. The
bench, the bar, and litigants have few kind words for the system. The
threat of delay and cost from "over-discovery" likely means many liti-
gants with deserving cases must simply opt out of the system, or settle
cases that otherwise would be tried on unfavorable terms. Those who use
the system are less likely to get a trial of their claims or defenses, and
face longer waits to get there.
Proportionality guidelines written into the existing rules, but rarely
used or enforced, should become the governing rule. This must be done
explicitly. Proportionality must be made the norm, not the exception-
the starting point, rather than an afterthought. Proportionality guidelines
should not simply be available, they should be imposed. The "broad and
liberal" standard should be abandoned in place of proportionality rules
that make "relevancy" part of the test for permissible discovery, but not
the starting point. If we are to take back the system, and restore accessi-
bility to meritorious cases, no matter their size, we are compelled to
make fundamental changes. Hopefully these changes will enable us to
stop litigating discovery and start trying a greater number of meritorious
cases. The Pilot Project Rules of the ACTL and IAALS are a bold step in
this new direction. If embraced by the courts, parties and their counsel,
such proportionality guidelines offer hope that the system can actually
live up to its first goal as expressed in Federal Rule 1: securing for the
average citizen, as Justice Powell would say, a "just, speedy and inex-
pensive determination" of her case.
121
120. The ACTL and IAALS have recognized that such additional reforms may need to accom-
pany proportional discovery to make it effective.
121. Powell, supra note 3, at 522 & n.4.
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